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In this paper, we study preferences over Savage acts that map states to  opportunity 
sets and satisfy a state-dependent version of  the Savage axioms.  Conditional prefer- 
ences over opportunity sets may be inconsistent with indirect-utility maximization. 
This is  interpreted as reflecting a  preference  for  flexibility due  to implicit  uncer- 
tainty about future preferences , or alternatively an intrinsic preference  for freedom 
of  choice. 
On a flexibility  interpretation, the main  result  of  the paper  (theorem 3) charac- 
terizes preferences based on maximizing the expected indirect utility in terms of  an 
"Indirect Stochastic Dominance" axiom.  The relevance of  theorem 3 to a freedom-of- 
choice context is established on the basis of  a novel multi-attribute conceptualization 
of  the notion of  effective freedom of  choice; the theorem delivers an additive multi- 
attribute representation with optimal uniqueness properties. 
The key technical tool of  the paper, a version of  Mobius inversion, is novel to the 
literature on  choice of  opportunity sets and has  been imported from  the theory of 
(non-additive) "belief-functions" ; it also yields a simple and intuitive proof of  Kreps's 
(1979) classic result. 
We  conclude by arguing that a thorough-going  revealed-preference  point of  view 
imposes incentive-compatibility constraints on the domain of  acts which amount to 
excluding future preferences from the definition of  an (explicit) state. 1. INTRODUCTION 
Flexia plans to undertake a plane trip; she has to decide whether to purchase an 
advance-reservation ticket now at a price p, or whether to wait until right before her 
intended date of  departure and then to finally decide between staying at home and 
purchasing a ticket at a higher price q.  Flexia's "present choice" can be thought of 
as one among "opportunity sets", here {fly  Q p, stay Q p) and {fly  Q q, stay @ 01, 
from which her "future choice" is then made. 
Flexia has fairly common present preferences over opportunity sets; if required to 
make a final choice now among basic alternatives  (singleton opportunity sets), she 
would  most  prefer to purchase a ticket  in advance (fly  @ p  >-  stay 8 0).  On the 
other hand, if  possible, she prefers to %wait-and-see"  ({fly  @  p, stay 8 p)  4  {fly 
@ q, stay  @  0)).  Note that these preferences are not compatible with a  ranking 
of  opportunity  sets according to their indirect  utility  (i.e.  by  ranking  the sets as 
equivalent to their currently best element)'.  They are naturally explained, however, 
as due to an uncertainty about her own future preferences between making the trip 
and staying at home. 
Such preference forpexibility received its first axiomatic study in a classic paper by 
Kreps (1979) which characterized the class of  preferences that rank opportunity sets 
in terms of  their expected indirect (=maximal attainable) utility (Em),  the expecta- 
tion being taken with respect to an implicit2 state space describing future preferences. 
Kreps assumed that present choices determine future opportunity sets deterministi- 
cally. Such an assumption is obviously very restrictive; for instance, if  Flexia decides 
to wait, realistically she will need to reckon with the risk that seats may no longer be 
available later. The present paper characterizes EIU maximization in such more gen- 
eral situations in which the agent may  be uncertain about the opportunity set she is 
- 
'assuming greater wealth to be preferred, of course. 
'That  is: part of  the representation, not of  the set-up. going to face, and in which at least some of  the uncertainty about future preferences 
is explicitly modeled. 
Thus, at the heart of  this paper's analysis is a distinction  between explicit and 
implicit state spaces.  In various guises, this distinction is of  significant conceptual 
interest.  As shall be argued, it corresponds, roughly speaking, to distinctions be 
tween verifiable / non-verifiable and foreseen / anticipated unforeseen contingencies, 
between incentive-compatible and arbitrary Savage acts, and, finally, between pref- 
erence for flexibility itself and intrinsic preference for freedom of  choice.  Before de- 
scribing these alternative interpretations of  the theory in greater detail in the second 
half of  this introduction, we  first sketch the main result of  the paper. 
In formal terms, we  will study preferences over  acts f  ("opportunity  acts") that 
map states 0 E 63  to opportunity sets A E A = ~-~\fl  of  alternatives z E  X .  Both 
states as well as prizes (opportunity sets) are to be understood as described in terms 
of  what is knowable ex-interim, rather than as complete descriptions of  everything 
relevant, as "small worlds" rather than "grand worlds" in Savage's terminology (1972, 
pp.82).  By  consequence,  belief  cannot  be  fully disentangled from value.  As  with 
singlevalued acts, this leads to statedependent preferences. Thus, we  take as point 
of  departure for our characterization a statedependent version of  Savage's axioms 
(Karni-Schrneidler (1993)  )  . 
If  preferences are defined  over  opportunity  acts,  incompleteness of  description 
(specifically:  the absence of  future preferences from the definition of  a state) mani- 
fests itself additionally in conditiclnal preferences displaying a preference for flexibility. 
That is to  say, it will typically not be the case, even for events E such that preferences 
are stateindependent on El that the following property holds. 
Conditional IU-Property) 
For all sets (constant acts) A, B E A, all acts f  E 3,  and all events E  O : 
[A,  E;  f,  E
C] ? [B,  E;  f,  E"]  implies [A,  E;  f,  E
C]  [A U B, E;  f,  E'].~ 
3[A,  E;  f,  EE] denotes the act that coincides with the constant act A on E and with f outside E; The key issue is to find axiom? that yield an expected-utility representation with 
respect to the implicit uncertainty concerning future preferences.  Partial solutions 
can be found in the work of  Kreps (1979,1992). Kreps (1979) characterizes the impli- 
cations of  EIU maximization for  preferences over constant acts, that is: opportunity 
sets.  The obtained restrictions, described by  the following condition, are weak.4 
Building on  this result, Kreps (1992) introduces uncertainty explicitly into the 
model and shows that EIU maximization entails implications analogous to OSM for 
conditional preferences over opportunity  acts.  However, these implications are only 
ordinal in character and fail to characterize EIU maximization by far. Consequently, 
he obtains a representation in which the utility of  an act is monotone but not neces- 
sarily additive in implicit-state utilities. 
In an explicitly stochastic context, EIU maximization has additionai and interesting 
cardinal implications.  For  example, it  entails the following cardinal  (conditional) 
version of  OSM, which implies that opportunity subsets are of  necessity substitutes 
for each other. 
CSM)6 For all set,s,  A, B, C E A, all acts g, h E 3,  and all events E  O : 
[A,  E;  g,  E
C] h: [Au B, E;  h, E
C]  implies [AuC, E;g,  E
C]  [Au BuC, E;  h,  E
C]. 
CSM asserts that the incremental value of  a set B of  additional alternatives never 
increases as further alternatives become available; note that a conditional version of 
OSM results by restricting CSM tog,  h such that g = h. While coming much closer to 
cf. section 3. 
4Conversely, an additive representation is of  limited significance in this context, as Kreps (1979, 
p. 567) points out. 
50SM  for  "Ordinal Submodularity", cf. section 4. 
'CSM stands for  "Cardinal Subrncdularity" . characterizing EIU rationalizable preferences, CSM fails to capture all their cardinal 
implications.7 
To characterize EIU-maximization, we  introduce  an axiom  "Indirect  Stochastic 
Dominance" (ISD*) that makes use of  the ''more-likely-relation"  2 over events de- 
rived from preferences over bets in the usual way.  Roughly speaking, ISD* formalizes 
the notion that acts that "in expectation offer effectively  more choice" are better. 
More specifically, ISD* requires that  f be weakly  preferred  to g whenever, given 
any hypothetical (future) weak  order R, the R-best available alternatives under f 
are 2-more-likely to be R-better .than under g ("first-order stochastically dominates 
in utility"; see sections  two and  three).  For  example, ISD* entails the following 
condition ISD:!  which evidently is closely related to CSM. 
ISD2) For any event E such that E is  ?-equally likely to its complement E
C  and 
anyA4,B,C  EA:  [A, E;A(J  BuC,EC]  5 [AuB,E;AuC,  E
C]. 
Specialized to state-independent  preferences, the main result (theorem 3) charac- 
terizes En--rationalizable prefere:nces >:  as those satisfying the Savage axioms plus 
ISD*. 
The notion of a  "preference for flexibility"  translates  into decision  theory,  and 
thereby generalizes, one of  the central .ideas of  financial economics, the notion that 
"options have value"; for  example, the theory of  option-pricing has profoundly  af- 
fected the theory of  investment in physical capital under the name of  "real options" 
(see especially the recent monogrisph by Dasgupta/Pindyck  (1994)). A more general 
decision-theoretic approach seem!: clearly desirable in contexts in which markets are 
thoroughly incomplete (as is the case for many investments in human capital, e.g. the 
71n addition, CSM does not seem to be fully satisfactory conceptually:  that the incremental value 
of  additional alternatives be  non-increasing seems plausible enough, but how compelling can it be? 
Indeed, it can be shown that CSM may easily be  violated if  the decision maker is  uncertainty-averse 
in the sense of  Gilboa-Schmeidler (1989). comparatively "inflexible" decisions to obtain a Ph.D. training in economic theory 
rather than an M.B.A., for instance), or where markets are entirely absent; - in a 
somewhat playful and speculative vein.,  Dasgupta and Pindyck stress the irreversibil- 
ity inherent in the decisions to marry and commit s~icide.~ 
While the economic importance of  preference for flexibility seems evident, an ax- 
iomatic approach to preference for flexibility is motivated by an interest in the distinc- 
tion between explicit and implicit states fundamental to the opportunity act model. 
A polarity of this kind arises naturally from a variety of  perspectives; while the second 
and third oppositions described below are conceptually of  a rather different nature, 
they turn out to be mathematically isomorphic in a precise way. 
1.  The distinction  between explicit and implicit states captures at a  primitive 
level important restrictions on the elicitation and even "construction" of  an agent's 
preferences. In descriptive, especially in experimental applications, one may want to 
confine attention to acts defined in terms of  verifiable or contmctible contingences
g 
If  one seriously wants to test experimentally whether and to what extent a subject's 
behavior conforms to SEU-maximization, one will elicit preferences over acts defined 
in terms of  a finite set  of  contingencies that  is coarse almost  by  definition.  The 
phenomenon of  preference for  flexibility shows that implicit  (not directly elicited) 
uncertainty matters  in  a sequential setting even to decisions between acts whose 
consequences are fully described in terms of  the coarse explicit state-space. 
From a first-person  point  of  view,  the explicit  state-space may  analogously  be 
interpreted as the space of  fores~~en  contingencies determining the class of  thought- 
experiments relevant to the decision-maker's preference construction.  Violation of 
the conditional  TCT  property can then be viewed as reflecting anticipated unforeseen 
contingencies (Kreps 1992); for example, Flexia may explain her preference for flexi- 
'see also JonesOstroy (1984) for a decision-theoretic model which relates the value of flexibility 
tb the amount of  information to be received. 
gNote that many "Dutch book" argument for the sure-thing principle rely on the contractibility 
of contingencies. bility by the expectation that "quite possibly somethang will interfere with my travel 
plans", without having a clear idea about specifically what is likely to interfere. For 
another example, we  note that in discussions of  the value of  preserving biodiversity, 
the irreversibility of  extinction occupies frequently a central place.  Preserving species 
for another generation keeps the option of  their continued existence open, an option 
which has significant value in view of  our uncertainty about the preferences of  future 
generations which presumably we cannot foresee in any detail. 
A conceptualization of  anticipated unforeseen contingencies in terms of  a set  of 
implicit decision-relevant states is interesting particularly in that it combines (antici- 
pated) "unforeseenness" with notions of  subjective probability and expected utility1'; 
this contrasts with approaches in which "unforeseenness" is identified with ignorance 
of  some kind, as in Ghirardato (1.996) and Mukerjee (1995)''.  l2 
2.  It will be shown in section 7 that from a thorough-going revealed-preference 
perspective which identifies preferences with dispositions to choice-behavior, difficul- 
10 This is not  to belittle the seriousness of  the uniqueness issue in this context; see section 5 for 
further discussion. 
"For recent epistemic work on the related notion uf awareness, see Modica-Rustichini (1994) and 
Dekel-Lipman-Rustichini (1996). 
12~inally,  the issue of  "coarse explicit state-spaces" is central to  a related, but largely philosophical 
literature on Bayesian belief revision and "belief kinenLc.ticsn  (the locus classicus is Jeffrey (1965, ch. 
11). Coarseness there corresponds to the notion that rational belief change cannot be fully accounted 
for by Bayesian updating on "explicitly given" evidence. The literature emphasizes the existence of 
evidence that may be "non-verifiable" (e.g.  irnprewionistic judgements) and/or  "unforeseen" (e.g. 
future insights) ; see also Binmore-Brandenburger (1990) who forcefully spell out the problematic 
nature of  large-world assumptions.  Reservations have been articulated towards inclusion of  future 
beliefs (i.e. here: of  future preferences over bets) in the definition of  a state. If  these reservations are 
fully taken to heart, a theory of  the kind outlined in this paper is  required to justify  "as-if  Bayesian 
updating" (which is what EIU maximization amounts to in this context) with respect to the implicit 
uncertainty; in such a theory (with appropriately enriched structure), beliefs about future beliefs 
are revealed by  preferences over sets o,f future bets, i.e.  by  the "flexibility value of  effective belief 
revision". ties arise for a direct application of  Savage's theorem in which future preferences are 
incorporated in the description of  a state and in which the preference ordering is 
defined on the class of  all Savage acts:; in  particular, it is not obvious which class 
of  acceptable thought-experiments can support  arbitrary acts (i.e. acts that depend 
on the decision-maker's future preferences in arbitrary ways).  We  will  thus argue 
that a  "revealed-preference" interpretation of  future preferences implies  incentive- 
compatibility restrictions on the domain of  acts which in turn lead to models equiva- 
lent to the opportunity-act model stu&ied  in this paper. 
3. Last but not least, if  one assumes that all uncertainty is modelled in standard 
ways13, and preference for flexibility is thus fully accounted for in terms of  the explicit 
uncertainty, a failure of  preferences tat  satisfy the conditional  TCT  property can by 
definition no longer be attributed to uncertainty about future preferences; instead, 
it reveals an intrinsic  "preference for  freedom of  choice."  It is in fact  this notion 
of  freedom of  choice which has been  at the center of  the recent wa-~e  of  interest in 
the axiomatic study of  ranking of  opportunity sets14. The present paper is the fist 
to simultaneously incorporate and distinguish within one model the two sources of 
preferences for opportunities.  l5 
The key step in making the results of  this paper equally applicable to a freedom- 
of-choice interpretation is a novel conceptualization of  effective freedom of  choice as 
a multi-attribute construct, with component opportunities (i.e. the opportunities to 
bring about particular consequences) d.ehing the different attributes.  The Indirect 
Stochastic Dominance axiom is reinterpreted accordingly as requiring that "in expec- 
tation more opportunity is better", and theorem 3 yields an additive multi-attribute 
representation with optimal uniqueness properties. 
13~hus  bracketing points 1 and 2. 
'*It will become clear that our results are equally applicable to rankings of opportunity sets purely 
in terms of freedom of choice, without regard to the agent's indirect utility. 
 he  nature and legitimacy of the distinction is intensively debated: for example, while Sen (1988) 
affirms it emphatically, Arrow  (1995) does not appear to see any meaning in it. The remainder of  the paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 considers a von Neurnann-Morgenstern-type  setting in which preferences 
are dehed on the class of  all (objective) probability distributions over opportunity 
sets; an objective version of  the Indirect Stochastic Dominance axiom is introduced 
and used to characterize  EIU  rationalizable  preferences (theorem 1).  We  present 
theorem 1 as a separate core result both to make it more accessible to the general 
reader unfamiliar with Savage's framework, and because from a mathematical point of 
view, the theorem is best understood as a result on mixture-spaces over opportunity 
sets. 
In section 3, a subjective version of  the Indirect  Stocha~5c  Dominance axiom is 
formulated; Karni-Schmeidler's (1993) generalization of  Savage's theorem to state- 
dependent preferences is then combined with theorem 1 to obtain a characterization 
state-dependent EIU rationalizahle preferences over opportunity acts. 
Section 4 introduces the key technical tool of  this paper, (dual) Mijbius inversion 
which is taken from the literature on belief-functions (non-probabilistic representa- 
tions of  uncertainty). It is shown that EIU rationalizable preferences are characterized 
by  a risk-aversion property with respect to the "size" of  the opportunity set.  Dual 
Mobius inversion is also shown to yield. a direct and intuitive proof of  Kreps's (1979) 
classic result. 
The following section 5 describes the uniqueness properties of  the representation. 
While these are significantly stronger  than those obtainable in a standard setting 
without explicit uncertainty, they still fall short of  what one might have hoped for. It 
becomes clear, however, what kind of  structure needs to be added to obtain optimal 
results. 
A reinterpretation of  the results in terms of  freedom of  choice is given in section 6. 
Finally, section 7 discusses the difficulties of  applying a direct Savage approach under 
a "revealed-preference" interpretation of  future preferences. All proofs are collected 
in the appendix. 2. AN AXIOMATIZATION OF EXPECTED INDIRECT UTILITY 
This section presents a charactlerization of  Expected Indirect Utility maximization 
in a von Neurnan-Morgenstern (vNM) context in which preferences are defined over 
"opportunity prospects" with nurnerically given probabilities and opportunity sets as 
prizes.  It serves both as a simplified versicn as well as a key  building block of  the 
main result of the paper, theorem 3 of  the following section. 
Let X denote a finite non-em:pty set  of  alternatives, A =  \ 0 the set  of  its 
non-empty subsets (opportunity sets),  and  denote the probability simplex in R-~ 
with typical element p.  (Ex ante-) preferences are described by  a relation k  on the 
set of  opportunity prospects AA. 
The chronology of  decision-making and uncertainty-resolution is as follows: at date 
1, an opportunity prospect p is chosen by  the agent.  Then, at some time between 
dates 1 and 2, say at date 1.5, the opportunity  prospect is resolved, yielding with 
probability  ps  the opportunity set  S  .  Finally, at date 2,  the agent  selects  one 
alternative among S. At date 1, the agent  is uncertain of  his preferences based on 
which date 2 choices are made; this uncertainty resolves before date 2. 
The uncertainty concerning da~te-1.5  opportunity sets may arise  "artificially" as 
result of  an agent's intentional randomization of  set-choices, or of  an experimenter's 
explicitly offering choices among "lotteries" with opportunity sets as prizes.  Often, 
opportunity prospects also arise naturally, as in the following example  modifying 
Kreps (1979). 
Example 1  At lunchtime, the agent has to make a reservation at a restaurant of her 
choice for dinner with a friend.  She wants to choose the restaurant offering the best- 
tasting meal to her friend.  Since she knows his tastes (at dinner) only incompletely, 
her choice  among restaurants  will  exhibit  a  'jreference for jlexibility".  Since  she 
is also uncertain of the menu (set of  meals) offered by  each restaurant, a restaurant 
represents a (subjective) pmspect over menus.  To satisfy the domain assumption, one needs to ask the agent to imagine hypothetical  "restaumnts" wmpondang  to arbitmy 
subjective  (but  not  yet  decision-theomtically derived) pmbability  distributions  over 
menu. 0 
To capture formally uncertainty about future tastes in the intended representation, 
let Cl denote a (finite) set of  preference-determining contingencies w with associated 
utility-function  v,  , and let X  E A" denote a probability distribution over 0. Note 
well  that for opportunity  prospects,  i.e.  (marginal) probability distributions over 
opportunity sets,  to denote well-defined objects of  preference, these distributions 
must be stochastically independent of  the uncertainty governing future preferences. 
This assumption becomes explicit in a Savage setting (where it will be relaxed and 
further discussed); it  is  reflected here in the axiom ISD below, and motivates the 
following definition of  the class of  "Expected Indirect Utility" (EIU-) rationalizable 
preferences. 
Definition 1  ? is EIU-rationalizable if  there exists a  finite  set 0,  X  E An  and 
utility-functions  {u,),~~  such that, for all p  q E nA: 
Remark:  In order to preserve generality, we  have allowed in this definition the 
implicit state-space R to be arbitrary (finite), herein following Kreps (1979).  It is 
debatable whether these are really meaningful; one may want to restrict attention to 
a canonical space of  states that is logically constructed from the data, i.e.  ultimately 
from the universe of  alternatives X. A natural candidate for such a canonical state- 
space is the set of  all weak orders on X.16 
Basic to the characterization of  EN-rationalizable preference relations are the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern axioms vNM . 
- 
16~owever,  fixing  R  in this way  is not  enough to ensure essential uniqueness; see section 5 for 
further discussion. Axiom 1 (vNM) 
i) (Completeness) p k  q or  p 5 q , for all p, q E A*. 
iz)  (Transitivity) p k  q and q >- r imply p >- r , for all p,  q, r E nd. 
iii) (Independence) p ? q -+=+  ap+ (1 -  a)r ? aq+ (1  -  a)r , for all a : 0 < a < 1 
and all p, q, r E Ad. 
iv) (Continuity) p ? q ? r =+-  3a : 0 5 a 5 1  such that ap + (1 -  a)r -  q , for 
all p, q, r E A*. 
The final axiom is based on an "Indirect Stochastic Dominance" relation defined 
as follows. For S C  A, let p(S)  = C p-r. denote the probability of S. 
TES 
Definition 2  The prospect  p indirectly stochastically dominates q with respect  to 
the weak order1'  R  071 X  ("p  kR  q") if and only if, for all  y E X : 
p indirectly stochastically dominates q  ("p  r> q") if it indirectly stochastically 
dominates q with respect to every weak order R on X. 
In other words,  p indirectly stochast,ically dominates q if, given any  hypothetical 
weak  preference ordering over  alternatives R  and  any  associated  ordinal  indirect 
utility-function  UR,  the probabi1it.y distribution of  indirect  utilities p  o uil induced 
from  p first-order stochastically  dominates (in the ordinary sense) the analogously 
defined probability distribution q o ukl. 
Indirect Stochastic Dominance restricted to degenerate prospects that yield with 
probability one some opportunity set  A  (and written as lA)  coincides with mono- 
tonicity with respect t,o  set-inclusion; in a stochastic setting, it is however much richer 
in content. 
17i.e.: complete and transitive relation. 1  1  1  Example 2  Let X  = 1x9 Y,  21, P = ;il{X,,)  + 4liX,z) , and  = 21{x)  + 21{x,y,z)  . 
Then p p q,  but not q  p. 
This is easily verified.  If x  is a best alternative with respect to R, it is available with 
probability one under p and q,  and thus p pH  q as well as q DR  p.  If, on  the other 
hand, x is not a best alternative with respect to R, thel8 R-bat alternative is available 
with probability  one half under each.  Under p, the at-least-second-best  alternative is 
always available, and thus p pR q  again.  However, if x  is worst with respect to R, 
with probability  one half  not even the second-best option is available  under q , and 
thus not q DR  p  for such R.  It  follows that p D q, but not q p  p. 
Axiom 2  (ISD) p >- q whenever p indirectly stochastically  dominates q. 
Remark:  Note that, for the use of  the unconditional distributions over opportu- 
nity sets p and q to be legitimate in the definition of  R-conditional dominance and 
of  ISD, these have to coincide with the i~-conditional  distributions;  that is to say, 
the distributions of  state-contingent  preferences R,  and opportunity sets must  be 
subjectively independent. 
The following characterization of  Indirect Stochastic Dominance is a straightfor- 
ward consequence of  the adopted definitions. 
Fact 1  The following  three statements are equivalent: 
iii) For all utility-functions v on X :  C ps mazes  v(x)  2 C  qs rnax,,~  v(z) . 
SEA  SEA 
Theorem 1  is EIU-rationalizable  if  and  only  if it satisfies  uNM and  Indirect 
Stochastic Dominance. 
Theorem 1 belongs to a family of  decision-theoretic results that obtain an addi- 
tively separable representation by appropriately augmenting the vNM axioms. These 
''breaking  ties arbitrarily throughout. include in particular Harsanyi's (1955) Utilitarian representation theorem, as well as 
Anscombe-Aumann's (1963) characterization of  SEU maximization.  The role of  ISD 
is played by a Pareto-condition in the former and by an (implicit, see Kreps (1988, 
p.107)) "only marginals matter" condition in the latter. The analogy to Harsanyi's 
theorem is particularly close, in that ISD functions as  a monotonicity-condition anal- 
ogous to the Paret~condition  th.ere.  Jaffray's  (1989) rnixture-space  approach  to 
belief-functions, by contrast, enhances the vNM axioms in a rather different direc- 
tion. 
3. PREFERENCE FOR FLEXIBILITY IN A SAVAGE FRAMEWORK 
In this section, the characteriza.tion of  EIU rationalizable preferences is extended 
to a fully subjective Savage-style formulation in which preferences are defined over 
acts that map states to opportunity sets.  Theorem 1 can be  translated to a Sav- 
age framework (with state-independent  preferences) for  the following two reasons: 
first, the ISD axiom uses probabilities only in ordinal, comparative way, and is thus 
straightforwardly put into subjective terms.  Secondly, ISD thus translated retains 
its force due to the richness of  Savage acts, specifically: to the fact that any subjec- 
tive probability distribution over opportunity sets is generated by some opportunity 
act.lg  Besides providing an interpretation of  theorem 1 in subjective terms, "going 
Savage" opens an important  dimlension of  generality by explicitly raising the issue 
of  state-independent preference.  We  will argue that state-independence is a rather 
restrictive assumption in an opportunity-act setting, and present an additive state- 
dependent generalization of  Savage's theorem.  We  will  then "subjectivize" ISD to 
obtain a subjective, state-dependent generalization of  theorem 1. 
Three basic types of  explicit uncertainty can be distinguished in the present con- 
lQ1.e.,  in  the  notation  to follow,  if  kc  denotes  the agent's subjective  probability measure on 0, 
{C1~f-l~f~~)=~A. text: the agent may be uncertain as to which opportunity set results from a particular 
present choice (e.g., in Flexia's case, the availability of  a ticket if she does not buy one 
now), the agent may receive information about the comparative value of  alternative 
final choices (e.g., if  Flexia is worried about the health of  her child, her final decision 
may depend on his body temperature), and thirdly the final choice itself may be one 
under uncertainty  (e.g, at the time of  her final decision, Flexia may still not know 
whether the child will fall seriously ill.). In this paper, we will deal with uncertainty 
that resolves before the final choice is made, i.e.  with uncertainty of  the fist two 
kinds.  Uncertainty not  resolving before the final choice is not explicitly modeled; 
doing so promises to be a worthwhile (see the concluding remark of  section  5) and 
non-trivial task for future research.  Uncertainty of  the first kind is associated with 
state-independent preferences, uncertainty of  the second kind with state-dependent 
preferences. Thus, to assume global state-independence would be highly restrictive, 
as it effectively eliminates uncertainty of  the second kind. 
We  first state an appropriate st,ate-dependent generalization of  Savage's theorem 
that comes tailor-made from the literature; this result is then combined with theorem 
1 to yield the main result of  the paper, a subjective state-dependent generalization 
of  ElU rationalizable preferences over opportunity acts. 
Some additional notation and definitions. 
0 :  the space of  explicit states 9. 
F  :  the class of  opportunity acts f : O +  A. 
  con st :  the subclass of  constant acts, typically denoted by  the constant prize. 
[f,  E;g,  EC]  :  the act h such that, for 6'  E 0, 
:  a preference relation on 3. 
f  kEg :  whenever [flE;hlE
C] >-  [glE;hlE
C] forsome h~3("f  isweakly preferred to g given the event El1). 
E is null if  f  YE  g for all f,  g E F. 
The following three axioms are exactly Savage's PI, P2 (the "sure-thing principle" 
in standard, if  not Savage's, terminology), and the richness and continuity condition 
P6. 
Axiom 3 (PI) 2  is  transitive a71d  complete,  ie. a weak order. 
Axiom 4 (~2)  For all f,g,  h,  h'  E 3, E C  @ :  [f,  E;  h,, E
C] 2  [g, E;  h, E
C] if  and 
only if  [f,  E;  h', E
C]  [g, E;  h', E
C]. 
Axiom 5 (P6) For all f,  g E 3 such that f  + g and all h  E Fconst,  there exists a 
finite partition 7-t of  O such that, for all H E 7-t: 
i) [h,  H;  f,  HCl  + 91 
ii) f + [h,  H;  g, H
c]. 
The generalization of  Savage's theorem to be used assumes "hitary  statedependence". 
Definition 3  An event G is a state-independent preference (s.i.p.)  event with respect 
to k  if  the following  three conditions are satisfied: 
i) For non-null E CI G, and all f,g  E FcmSt  :  [f,  E; hl  E
C] k  [g,  E;  h,  E
C] if  and 
only iff kc g. 
ii)  For all E,F C  G  and f,g,  f',gf E FcmSt  such that f  +G  g  and f' +G  g': 
[f,  E;  g, Ec]  ? [f,  F;  9,  FC]  if  and only if  [f',  E;  g',  EC]  t  [f',  F;  g', PC]. 
iii)  There exist f,  g E FCmSt  :  f  +G  g. 
Condition iii) requires G to be non-null, i) and ii) are Savage's state-independence 
axiom P3  and P4 restricted to G. The preference relation  is finitely state-dependent 
if  there exists a finite partition20 {Oi)iEr  of  O such that each Qi  (for  i E I) is an 
sip.  event. 
'OF'or  transitive k,  it  is easily verified that one might have equivalently replaced  "partition" by 
"collection"; we choose the former for greater specificity. Axiom 6 (P345*)  is finitely state-dependent. 
The assumption of  finite state-dependence can be viewed as having two parts: con- 
ditional on each @,,  there is a rich, non-atomic set of  contingencies within which pref- 
erences are state-independent; this follows from Q, being non-null and P6. Secondly, 
state-dependence can be described in terms of  a  finite partition. The second of  these 
assumptions is made for  technical convenience; the first,  however, has substantive 
content, as it is indispensable for a characterization of  subjective Em-maximization 
based on an ISD  type axiom.  Kote that state-independence of  preferences condi- 
tional on E C  ei  requires in effect  that, conditional on Oi,  any implicit uncertainty 
about future preferences is subjectively stochastically independent of  the explicit un- 
certainty  0. For simplification of  language,  we  take in  the following  the partition 
{O,}iEI as given and will abbreviate kei to ki  ; theorems 2 and 3 are to be read 
accordingly. 
For any finitely-ranged function x : O -+ R,  define 
Theorem 2 (Karni-Schmeidler)  on 3 satisfies PI, P2, P345*  and P6  if  and 
only if there exists a collection of finitely additive, convex-range#'  probability measures22 
{pi  : 2e  -+  R};E1 such that pi(@,) = 1  and  a collection  of  non-constant  utility- 
functions {u~}~~  I  such that 
f t  9 if and only if  J ui(  f (8))dpi  t c  J  ui(g(o))dpi  , for ail  f,  9 E 3.23 
iEI  &I 
is said to be  conva-mnged if, for all  E C  8 and all p : 05  p 51, there exists FCE such that 
4F)=pp(E). 
"For  notational convenience, the measures pi  are defined on 2e  instead of  on 2e';  in view of 
the fact that pi(Bi)  = 1, they can nonetheless be interpreted as subjective conditional probability 
measures. Analogous remarks apply to the subsequently defined relations 2,  . 
23~arni-~chmeidler  assume P3, but their proof is easily modified to a partition-relativized version 
of  P3. It remains to "subjectivize" ISD as ISD*.  ISD* is  naturally formulated  here as 
an assumption on conditional preferences ki,  since comparative probability relations 
can meaningfully be defined only conditional on s.i.p.  events Oi.  Thus, let  >i be 
the conditional more-likely-than relation on 2e  defined by 
E >i  F if, for any constant acts f,  g such that f +, g : [f,  E;  g, E
C] ki [ f,  F;  g, F
C]. 
Note that by  part ii) of  the definition of  an s.i.p. event, "any" can be replaced by 
"all" in the definition of  >i, and that E 2i F if  and only if  pi (E)  2  pi(F). 
Moreover define 
Definition 4 f  Di  g  ("  f  indirectly stochastically dominates g conditional on Oin), 
iff,  for all weak oders R on X  and all x E  X: 
(0 E @If  (6) n  {Y  E XIyfi) # 0)  >i (0 E @lg(Q)  n  {Y  E XIyh}  # 0). 
The following is a subjective, conditional version of  ISD. 
Axiom 7 (ISD*, Indirect Stochastic Dominance)  For all  f,g E  F  and  all 
i E I : f ki  g whenever f  Pi g  . 
ISD* can be expressed purely in preference terms: if  f and g coincide outside Qi, 
and if  any  bet  on attaining under f  any level set of  any weak  order conditional on 
Qi, i.e.  the bet on the event  (6 E 01  f (0) n  {y  E Xlyk)  # 0) fl  Oi, is preferred to 
the corresponding bet based on g, then f  itself is weakly preferred to g. 
The following result, the main theorem of  the paper, is a straightforward conse- 
quence of  theorems 1 and 2. Note that in the representation, the implicit probability 
distributions X~ over future preferences are allowed to depend on Qi. Theorem 3  A  preference relation over opportunity acts  satisfies PI, P2, P345*, 
P6  as well as ISD if and only zf  there exist  and {u~},,~  as in theorem 2 and 
such that each ui  ha  the form ui(A)  =  C  XSi maxseA vLi (x) (for appmpriate Ri, 
w,  € 0, 
E A%  , and  {v$)~;ER~). 
As remarked  before, the richness of  the state-space  implied by  P6 is critical to 
the validity of  the result.  The result would cease to hold with additively separable 
preferences and a finite state space as in Kreps (1992); it is easily verified, for instance, 
that the result is false if  8  consists of  only one state, since then ISD* coincides with 
monotonicity with respect to set-inclusion which is not enough according to theorem 
5 below. 
4. THE SIMPLE ALGEBRA OF EXPECTED INDIRECT UTILITY 
Sections 2 and 3 have left two bits of  unfinished business. The uniqueness proper- 
ties of  the representation have not been discussed. One would also like to know more 
explicitly  the nature of  the restrictions  imposed  by  EIU-rationalizability on  pref- 
erences over opportunity  prospects, and especially the restrictions on the cardinal 
utility-functions  u representing those preferexes ( "EIU functions").  Both of  these 
issues will now  be addressed based on a preceding exposition of  the algebra of  EIU 
functions u . The basic novel insight of  this section is the observation (fact 2) that the 
structure of  EIU functions is closely related to that of  "plausibility-functions" (con- 
jugate belief-functions) in the literature on non-probabilistic belief  representations; 
as a result, the key technical tool of  that literature, Mobius inversion (originally due 
to rtota 1964), becomes applicable and central here as well. It has in fact been used 
already in the proof of  theorem 1; among other applications, Mobius inversion proves 
its mettle at the end of  this section by  yielding a particularly transparent  proof of Kreps's (1979) main result  .24 
Let  A* = 2X\(0 U {X)).  #S is. the cardinality of  the set S, with #X = n,  and 
C denotes the strict subset relatiom.  1: A -t  R is the constant function equal to 1, 
1s : A -) R is the indicator-function of  the set of  sets S.  Functions from A to R 
will often be viewed as vectors in 1tA 
A function u : A +  R is an indirect  utility (IU) function if  it has the form 
u(A) = max,,Au({x))  for all  A  E  A.  An  function u : A -+  R is an expected 
indirect  utility  (EIU) function if  it is a convex  combination of  KJ-functions: 
u(A)  = C AUvw(A)  = C A,   mar:,^^ v,,({x)) for all  A E A, for some finite collec- 
w€R  wE0 
tion of  W-functions {v,),~~  and some set of  coefficients {A,),,n  such that A,  2  0 
for all w  E  and  C A,  = 1. Thus, preferences over opportunity prospects / acts are 
wen 
Em-rationalizable if  and only if  they have a vNM / Savage representation in terms 
of  an ElU function u. 
An IU function is dichotomous (and 0-1 normalized) (DIU) if  it takes the values 
0 and 1 only, i.e. if  u(A)  {0,1).  Finally, a function u : A -+  R is simple if  u = us 
for some S E 2",  with vs  : A -, R. defined by 
/ 
The follo&ng observation characterizes EIU functions as equivalent to certain lin- 
ear combinations of  dichotomous IU  (respectively simple) functions. 
Fact 2  i)  u is a DIU-function if  and ody  if u is  simple. 
ii) u is an ICJ-function if and o;dy if 
u  = C Asus  , for A E R~  such that As  2  0 for all S # X,  and such that As  > 0 
SEA 
and AT  > 0 imply S 5  T  or S > T  . 
iii) u is an EIU-function if  and! only if 
u = C  Asvs,  for A E R~  such that .As  > 0  for all S # X. 
SEA 
24~he  classical references on belief-functions are Dernpster  (1967) and Shafer (1976); for a recent 
thorough study of  Mijbius inversion, the key  technical tool, see Chateauneuf-JafTray (1989). Example 3  Let X = {1,2,3) and u the ICJ-function defined by u(S)  = max,,~  x2. 
Then  =  v{1,2,3}  +  3v(2,3) +  5"J{3) . 
Mathematically, the key  to the following analysis is the observation that the set 
of  DIU functions is a linear basis of  the space R~.  How  DIU-functions combine (in 
particular to yield ETU  functions) is described by  the "dual Miibizls  ~~enztor"~~  Q : 
Rd +  R~ defined by X H  u = C As us, and thus u(A)  = !P(A)(A) =  C  XS , 
SEA  S€d:SnA#0 
for A E A. 
Basic is the following fact. 
Fact 3  \k : Rd -+ R~  is a bijective linear map. Its inverse W ' is given by 
Q-l(u)(A)  =  C  (-l)#(A\S)+lu(~c)  for A E A , with u(0)  = 0 by conventior~. 
s~2x:ScA 
The fact  allows a straightforward characterization  of  Em-functions in terms of 
2n -  2 linear inequalities. 
Corollary 1  u is an EIU  function if  and only if W1(u)(~)  2  0  for all A E A*. 
Drawing on the literature on belief-functions, the characterizing condition is made 
more intelligible by generalizing it to the following effectively equivalent pair of  con- 
ditions. 
Definition 5  i)  u : A -+  R is monotone if  A C  B implies u(A) 5 u(B)  VA, B E A. 
ii) u : A -+  R is uniformly submoddar if, for any finite collection {Ak)krK  in 
A such that  n Ak # 0, 
~EK 
25~or  the choice of  terminology, consult the proof of  fwt 3. 
2"he  c3njunction of  monotonicity and uniform submodularity differs from "infinite monotonicity" 
in the sense of  Choquet (1953) in  two ways: the latter condition would result if  in the definition of 
uniform submodularity the inequality would be reversed and if  the non-empty-intersection clause be Uniform Submodularity is easielst understood by  considering the case of  #K = 2, 
where it specializes to the following standard "submodularity" condition: 
or equivalently  : 
In this version, submodularity says that the incremental value of  adding some set 
a given set of  alternatives (the set B to A) never increases as other alternatives (the 
set C) are added. Submodularity implies that opportunity subsets are substitutes in 
terms of  flexibility value. 
Theorem 4  u  is an EIlJ function if  and only if it is monotone and uniformly sub- 
modular. 
Theorem  4  translates immediately into  a characterization  of  the risk  attitudes 
towards opportunity prospects implied by  EIU maximization. 
Definition 6 i)  is monotone if  for all A,  B  in A such that A > B. 
ii)  is opportunity risk-averse 2i  for any finite collection {AkIkEK  in d such 
that  n Ak # 8, and any q, p such that 
k€K 
q  is  defined  by  qs = 2-"+'  . #{J 5  K  I  #J is even and  strictly  positive  and 
S= U Ak, or J=8  and S= (-1  Ak), and 
k~ J  kt K 
p is defined  by ps =  2-nf1 . #{J 5 PC  1 #J is odd  and S = U Ak), 
kEJ 
then p  q. 
The connection of  this definition wit:h an intuitive notion of  risk-aversion emerges 
from considering prospects of  twlo opportunity sets.  Opportunity risk-aversion then 
specializes27  to the condition th,at, for  all  A, B, C  E A such that A > B U C  and 
"by  considering collections of  the form  {A\,B, A\C),  with B n  C =  0. 
2  1 Thus, losing one of  the opportunity subsets B or C for sure (each with equal odds) 
is weakly  preferred to facing a fifty-present chance of  losing both B and C.  All 
instances of  opportunity risk-aversion share the following two characteristics which 
together lend some minimal  justification  to viewing them as genuine instances  of 
risk-aversion: 
i) p({S  I  S 3 x)) = q({S  I S 3 x)) Vx  E X, and 
ii) for some S with qs > 0 :  p~  > 0 *  T > S VT  E A. 
Theorem 4 yields the following corollary: 
Corollary 2  on aA  is EIU-rationulizable if  and only  if  it satisfies vNA4  and is 
monotone and uniformly risk-averse. 
Remark:  While opportunity risk-aversion  emerges as a  natural characterizing 
property from a purely descriptive point of  view, it is not very appealing decision- 
theoretically as a conceptually fundamental axiom. It is toe complex to be particu- 
larly intuitive; more importantly, its link to an intuitive notion of  flexibility / indirect 
utility stands in need of  clarification; finally, ir, contrast to ISD, the role of  stochastic 
independence remains hidden. 
We conclude this section by providing a new and simplified proof of  Kreps's (1979) 
classic result which characterizes EIU rationalizable preference orders defined on the 
class of  opportunity  sets A.  The new  proof is based on dual Mobius inversion and 
given in the appendix; we  hope that it significantly clarifies the logic of  Kreps's result. 
For the remainder of  this section only, assume 2 to be a weak order on A. 
Definition 7  i) >.  is monotone if A > B implies A  B , for all A,  B E A. 
ii)  is ordinally submodular if A  A U B implies A U C  A U B U  C , for all 
A, B,C E  A. iii) 2  is ordinally EIU-rationalizable if there exists an ElUfunction u : A --+  R 
such that A  B if  and only if v(A) 2 u(B)  for all A,  B E A. 
Theorem 5  (Kreps)  A  weak oder  is  ordinally EIU-mtionalizable if  and only if 
it is  monotone as well as oniinally subwaoddar. 
The suflicient conditions of  the theorem seem surprisingly weak.  In particular, 
Kreps' result implies that whenever a preference relation is "strictly monotone" (i.e. 
satisfies the condition "A  > B =+  A t  B for all  A, B E A"),  it is ordinally  EIU- 
rationalizable.  To facilitate the discussion, we restate the result as one about ordinal 
utility-functions. 
Condition 1 (OSM) u(A) > u(A U B) +  .u(A  U C) 2 u(A U B U  Cy)  VA, B,  C E A. 
Theorem 6 (Kreps, restated)  For any function u : A -4 R: there exists a strictly 
increasing  transformation 7 : R -+  R such that T o u is an EIU function  if  and only 
zf u is monotone and satisfies  OShf. 
Consider any utility function with the property  A > B + u(A) > u(B) for all 
A, B  E  A.  According to theorem 6, for  an appropriate  T,  7 o u is uniformly sub- 
modular. The concave flavor of  uniform submodularity suggests that to achieve thls 
one needs to define transformations  T  that concavify u "sufficiently strongly."  The 
actual proof  in the appendix follows this line of  argument  (lemma 5), and verifies 
that indifferences are adequately taken care of  by condition OSM (lemma 4). 
5. ON THE UNIQUENESS OF  THE REPRESENTATION 
So far, the uniqueness properties of  the Em representation in theorem 1 and 3 have 
not  been discussed. This task will be addressed now, with dual Mobius inversion as 
the key tool. The story line goes as follows. There is an essentially unique represen- 
tation in terms of  dichotomous IU functions.  Dichotomous IU representations can be reinterpreted as additive mdti-attribute representations (eliminating the reference 
to an implicit state-space).  This allows one to characterize the exact extent of  the 
non-uniqueness problem; in particular, it becomes evident what  kind of  structure 
needs to be added to achieve uniqueness.  For the sake of  specificity, we  will explic- 
itly focus on the uniqueness properties of  preferences over opportunity prospects in 
a vNM setting; the extension to preferences over opportunity acts is immediate. 
From fact  2iii), EIU-rationalizability is equivalent to rationalizability  by  a set of 
dichotomous IU-functions; using dual Mobius inversion, it is easy to see  that "di- 
chotomous EIU-representations" enjoy optimal uniqueness properties.  is nontrivial 
if X t  {x) for some x E X. 
Proposition 1  i) k  is EIU-rationalizable if  and  only if  there  exists X  E R~  with 
AT  2  0 for all T # X  such that: 
ii) If  X  satisfies condition (3), then A'  satisfies condition (3)  as well if  and only if, 
for some c > 0 : A;  = cXT  for all T # ;Y 
iii) If  is nontrivial, there exists a unique X  E aA'  satisfying  (3)28. 
In the remainder of  this section, we  .will maintain the assumption that  is non- 
trivial  and refer  to X  E  AA* satisfying  (3) as the  "weight  vector"  or  "measure" 
representing k. 
While uniqueness of  dichotomous EJJJ  representations in the present context may 
not seem to amount to that much, it is a significant improvement over what is achiev- 
able when preferences are defined over opportunity sets. This improvement is obvi- 
ously due to the fact that the utility-functions representing preferences are unique 
up to positive affine rather than merely strictly increasing transformations.  In  the 
2sStrictly speaking, X 6  Ad such that  Xx  = 0. 
24 latter case, not even the support of  X is uniquely determined.  Moreover, proposition 
1 gives sufTicient indication for what  needs to be assumed of  the class of  possible 
future preferences in order to ensure optimal uniqueness properties. 
Only in very rare situations, of  course, will the decision maker in fact have dichote 
mow date-2 preferences, as in the following example in which X  may be interpreted 
as a subjective probability measure. 
Example 4  Flex needs to open a lock; he can choose among closed boxes with uncer- 
tain contents. Specifically, any box contains with probability ps exactly the non-empty 
set S  of keys x E X;  a box can thus be  ,identified with a probability measure p E AA. 
Having chosen the box,  Flex will  attempt to open the lock, trying out all keys in the 
chosen box.  He  cares only about  the chance of  success in opening the lock, and does 
not how  which keys if  any will  fit.  In this case, the relevant state space is 2X,  with 
T  E 2X denoting the set  of  keys that in fact  open the lock; in state T, Flex's  pref- 
erences over sets of  keys are  given by  the DIU-function v~;  in other words,  Flex is 
successful (vT(S)  = 1) if  the box S  contains at least  one key in T. 
Here, A*  denotes  also  the event that  some keys  fit  but  not  all  ("r  #  0, X).  By 
proposition  I, Flex's preference  ordering  over hypothetical  boxes  p E  Ad  reveals 
unambiguously his subjective probability measure X  E AA* over the sets of  keys that 
fit, conditional on some but  not all keys: in X  fitting, that is: conditional on A"  (the 
conditional  probability that exactly the keys in T  fit  is given by  AT) .  On the other 
hand,  contains no information about  the subjective probability  of  the conditioning 
event A'  itself  (beyond  its  being  non-zero),  since  if  either all  keys work  or none, 
Flex's choice of  a box does not matter. 0 
In the general case, in which future preferences may  be  non-dichotomous,  the 
coefficients of  a dichotomous EIU-representation yield  only  highly "compounded" 
information about the decision maker's beliefs about future preferences. The repre- 
sentation of  proposition 1 then needs to be rewritten a bit to become meaningfully interpretable. The starting point is the observation that the interpretation of  VT  as a 
utility-function is unnecessary and, in ,this case, unhelpful. Alternatively, VT can be 
viewed as indicator-function of  the class of sets that intersect with T,  VT  = l{slsnTfO). 
Correspondingly, T can viewed  as parametrizing not  a state but an attribute the 
"component opportunity" T.  S  realizes the component opportunity T if and only if 
its intersects with T (or, equivalently, iff vT(S) = I),  in other words:  if S permits to 
realize some alternative in T. 
Accordingly, the vNM utility of  S can uniquely be written as the sum of  the values 
AT  of  all component opportunities that it realizes: u(S)  =  C  As,  thus yielding 
T:TnS#0 
an additive  multi-attribute  representation in  terms of  which essential uniqueness is 
always ensured. 
If one is willing to postulate that the decision maker "in fact" maximizes expected 
indirect  utility  with given  {v~)~~  and subjective  probabilities  {T,),~~  , further 
explanation of  the attribute weights  AT  can  be given.  In view  of  fact  2ii), it is 
easily verified that the (non-normalized) coefficients AT  in (4) that correspond to the 
EIU-function  C ~,v, satisfy: 
wen 
and, for T different from X, 
Note that the expression "minZET  v,, ({x}) -~~XT'~T  minZET!  v,  ({x))" differs from 
zero (being then in fact ~ositive)  if  and only if  T is a level set of  v,,  i.e. if  T =  {x E X  I  v,({x))  2 vu(T)}. Thus AT  is the eqected incnemental utility from reaching the 
level set T rather than the next lower one. 
Together with proposition 1, (5)  precisely describes the extent of  non-uniqueness 
of  the EIU-representation.  Preferences thcs fail  to reveal  the agent's  subjective 
probability distribution over IU-functions v,  for two reasons.  First, even if  all IU- 
functions with positive probability are in fact dichotomous, their coefficients com- 
bine a subjective-probability and a utility-scale factor, as typical for state-contingent 
preferences.  Secondly, the same EIU-function can typically be generated as convex 
combination of  non-dichotomous IU-fun.ctions in many different ways. 
However,  (5) also suggests that the second source of  non-uniqueness is  not  in- 
escapable. In particular, uniqueness will obtain if  either due to additional conditions 
on >-  or simply by an external  "identif-ying" assumption, future preferences R,  are 
known to belong to some class R  with the property that any non-degenerate level set 
is associated with at most one preference ordering in that class, i.e.  formally that, 
for any x E X and any R, R'  E R,{ylyhih) = {y(yR'x)  # X  implies R = R'. Such R 
will be referred to as  identified. 
If R is identified, it can be made the canonical state space; k has then a represen- 
tation of  the form 
In view of  (5),  the VR in this representation are essentially unique:  specifically, if 
{vRIRER  represents k,  then {v'R}~~.~  represents ? as well if  and only if  there exists 
c > 0  and {dRIRER  such that  = CUR + dR for all R E R. 
An obvious example of  an identified c!lass  has already been introduced, that of  weak 
orders .R with only two level sets.  More interestingly, identified classes arise quite 
naturally with infinite domains X; examples are the class of  quasi-linear preferences 
on  a  domain  X  of  the form X  = Y  x R, and the class of  EU  preferences on a 
lottery space X of  the form X = AY . Of  course, the restrictions on preferences over opportunity sets implied by additional structure of this kind remain to be worked out. 
Note also that in a Savage framework, preferences of  the latter class arise naturally 
from uncertainty that is not resolved at date 2. 
6. FREEDOM OF CHOICE 
We will now consider situations in which all relevant uncertainty is explicitly mod- 
elled in the manner of  section 3, including uncertainty about future preferences.  A 
failure of  conditional preferences to satisfy the IU property can then by definition no 
longer be attributed to uncertainty about future preferences, but reveals an intrinsic 
"preference for freedom of  choice."  29 
As a sound intuitive basis for imposing consistency conditions on preferences for op- 
portunities, only the notion t hat "more opportunity is better" seems to remain.30~e 
will argue in this section that, properly conceived, this notion is rich enough to pro- 
vide the basis for an well-behaved theory of  intrinsic preference for freedom of  choice, 
and that in fact  one merely needs to reinterpret the results above to obtain such 
a theory.  By contrast, the bulk of  the literature has relied on independence condi- 
tions to obtain additional structure; these, however, are very restrictive and preclude 
consideration of  the diversity of  alternatives in an opportunity set3'. 
The key is an answer to the question: more precisely of  what  is better? To address 
it, we  take as  point  of  departure an interpretation  of  "freedom of  choice"  as the 
freedom to do this or that, to choose something particular, to bring about specific 
consequences such as living in  a particular place, entering a particular  profession, 
"We  leave to philosophy the task of explicating this intuitive appealing concept in a rigorous man- 
ner; for  a justification based on the notion that agents autonomously choose their own preferences, 
see Sugden (1996). 
300f  course, this requires to keep abstracting from phenomena such as weakness of  will, etc. 
31~ee  I'attanaik-Xu  (1990), Puppe  (1995), Nehring-Puppe  (1996a) as well as Sugden  (1996) for 
criticisms along this line. etc. . Thus, the freedom of  choice offered by  some opportunity set can be analyzed 
in terms of  its component opportunities to bring about particular consequences, and 
effective freedom of  choice is naturally viewed as multi-attribute construct, with the 
component opportunities as its relevant attributes. By "effective freedom of  choice" 
we  mean an agent's  inclusive valuation of  opportunity sets that combines indirect 
utility and freedom of  choice considerations; the notion of "effective freedom of choice" 
is thus understood to comprise as a special case the preferences of  agents who do not 
intrinsically value freedom of  choice,  i..e.  whose conditional  preferences kj satisfy 
the conditional IU-property;  in this case, the valued component opportunities are 
those associated with the attainment of  some level-set of  the form  {yl{y}  ki  {x)}. 
Up to the issue of  extensionality :raised below, the notion of  component opportunity 
coincides with that of  section 5 wlzich hiid been introduced there for largely technical 
reasons. 
A significant strand in the axiomatic literature on the ranking of  opportunity sets 
is interested in "measuring" freedom of  choice  exclusive of  considerations concern- 
ing an agent's welfare.  The notion of  a corilponent opportunity and the following 
analysis based on it are equally applicable under such an exclusive freedom of  choice 
interpretation, as illustrated by  the following example.  We  do not  pursue this in- 
terpretation further here, especially since its conceptual coherence stands in need of 
further ~larification.~~ 
Example 5  Renate is a  young  LSast  German woman currently living in the GDR~~ 
in the 1980s.  An alternative  consists of  a place  where she might live (East or West 
Berlin, E or W),  and of a profession she might enter (becoming a medical doctor or a 
journalist, D or J). The relevant universe of alternatives is X =  {w, x,  y, z),  with w = 
(E,  J),  x = (El  D), y = (W,  D),  and z = (W,  J). iit the level of  consequences, basic 
compon,ent opportunities are the oppodunity to live  in East  Berlin, the opportunity 
32~ugden  (1996) for one is highly skeptical. 
33~erman  Democratic Republic, R.I.P.. to live in West-Berlin, that of  becoming  a doctor, and that of  becoming  a journalist. 
Typically also logically  derived  component  opportunities are relevant, such as that of 
becoming a doctor while living in West- Berlin. 
To express component opportunities defined via consequences in terms of the primi- 
tives of  the model (i.e. alternatives), they need to be translated into their consequence 
edensions; the extension E C X of  a consequence is the set of  alternatives that bring 
about that consequence34. (Obviously, some information may be lost in translation, 
since different consequences may happen to have the same extensions).  The follow- 
ing matrix associates component opportunities and their extensions in the example 
above. 
Component Opportunity  E  W  D  J  W&J 
Extension  (~4)  Y  Y  {w14 (2) 
Component opportunities will  be described in the following extensionally, as the 
opportunity  to bring about  membership of  the chosen alternative in E, to "realize 
E", and will  be referred to by  their extensions. As in section 5, an opportunity set 
A  realizes  the  component  opportunity  E  if  and only  if  A  contains one alternative 
realizing El  in other words, if  and only  if  A n  E  # 0. 
In a stochastic setting, this suggests the following definition of  "more opportunity 
in expectation". 
Definition 8  The opportunity act  f  offers more opportunity in expectation than the 
opportunity act g  (f  g)  if  and  only if, for all component opportunities E E 2X and 
alli~  I: {OEQ~~(O)~E#~)>~{OEQ~~(O)~E#~). 
- 
34~n  logic, the extension of  a predicate is defined as the set of  objects that satisfy it.  In Frege's 
famous example,  the  predicates "is  the  morning  star"  and  ILis the evening  star"  have  the same 
extension, the planet Venus. Thus, f offers more opportunity in eqectation than g if, for any component oppor- 
tunity E E 2X and conditional on any (3;,  it is at least as likely for E to be realized 
under f as it is under g. 
It is easily verified that the ''offers  more opportunity than" relation coincides with 
the Indirect Stochastic Dominance; it is therefore denoted by the same symbol D. It 
follows from the above that the indirect stochastic dominance axioms ISD* and ISD 
capture the notion that more opportunity is better. State-dependence of  preference 
is highly plausible, again. For example, if  O = {el,  Q2),  with O1 denoting the event 
"Renate has married someone unwilling to leave East-Berlin", Renate's valuation of 
the component  opportunity W of: living in West-Berlin will  most  probably depend 
on whether Q1 is realized or its complement; correspondingly, her preferences over 
opportunity sets conditional on  and Q2  will  differ.  Moreover, to account  for  a 
co-existing preference for flexibility in terms of  explicit uncertainty, preferences need 
to be state-dependent.  To establish the relevance of  theorems 3 and 1 in a freedom- 
of-choice context, it remains to reinterpiret the representations. 
Theorem 3 yields a state-dependent additive multi-attribute representation, in which 
the utility-functions ui : A --+  R of  theorem 2 have the form ui(A) =  C  Xb 
E€A*:EnA#  0 
for appropriate state-dependent a.ttribute weights A&  .35  The collection of  weights 
{~b)~~~*  defines an additive measure  X~ on A*,  and the utility-representation can 
be rewritten as 
In view 01 the great popularity of  proposals to measure pure (IU-exclusive) freedom 
of  choice by  counting alternatives, a measure representation is of  some interest.  It 
shows that the notion of  counting makes sense after all, provided it is applied to the 
right type of  objects, component opportunities rather than alternatives. 
35~ote  that  the sum  is  taken over  7'  E A* rather  than T E 2X. While conceptually perfectly 
sensible, the consequence extensions 0  and X have been "normalized out" in the representation due 
to their irrelevance to preferences. Remark  1:  The counting of  alte~natives  (with possibly asymmetric weights) 
emerges as a special case in which A'  is concentrated on singletons, since then ui(A) = 
Ai({{x}lx  E A}). However, concentration of  Ai  on singletons means that the only 
valued consequences are those that can exclusively be realized by a single alternative. 
This seems to be a remarkably implausible implication even on a pure freedom-of- 
choice interpretation; for instance, in example 5, it means that realization of  no basic 
component opportunity has value by itself.  In fact, it is recognized by its apparent 
proponents that the counting of  alternatives is not entirely satisfactory, and that, in 
particular, it fails to take properly into account the diversity of  an opportunity set 
(see Pattanaik-Xu (1990) and Gravel-Laslier-Trannoy (1996)). 
Remark 2:  It is worth noting; that the manner of  counting has been motivated 
decision-theoretically rather than mathematically. On purely mathematical grounds, 
one might consider a dual measure based on all sets a given set contains, leading to 
uniformly supennodular (rather than submodular) vNM utility-functions of  the form 
ui(A) = Ai({EI E C  A)).  Such a measure is evidently devoid of  decision-theoretic 
content. 
From an inclusive valuation pers;pective,  the most promising strand in the literature 
is the emerging multi-preference approach in which opportunity sets are compared in 
terms of  a range of  "relevant" (or "reasonable") preferences; see in particular Jones- 
Sugden (1982), Pattanaik-Xu (1995), and Sugden (1996). The results of  this paper 
fit  naturally into this line of  research; one simply needs to reinterpret an EIU  ratie 
nalization as follows:  In the representing expression  C  ~3~  maxv;,(.)  of  theorem 
wieni 
3, Ri indexes the set  of  "reasonable" utility-functions  (with A&  > 0), conditional 
on Oi,  and A$  is naturally interpreted as the relevance-weight of  v$i  ; preferences 
satisfy the conditional IU property whenever all weight is concentrated on just one 
ordering.  Of  course,  just  as under the flexibility interpretation, there is the prob- 
lem of  non-uniqueness of  the representation, and in particular that of  disentangling relevance-weights from utility-scides. In this context, the present paper contributes 
the first  cardinal representation and, more specifically, an additive aggregation rule. 
By comparison, the aggregation rules proposed in the literature are ordinal and en- 
tirely different in character (see l'attanaik-Xu  (1995), Puppe-Xu (1995)). Moreover, 
with the exception of  Nehring-Puppe (1.996b), the set of  relevant preferences is taken 
as given rather than derived from a representation theorem. 
It is clear  from  the discussioi~  of  section  5 that  within  the framework studied 
here, the multi-attribute and the multi-preference interpretations are "obsewationally 
equivalent". It remains to be seen whet'her the two can be distinguished in interesting 
ways if  more structure is assumed. 
7.  INCENTIVE-COMPATIBILITY 
In this section, we  discuss the viability of  a direct  Savage-style approach in which 
future preferences enter the description of  a state.  We  will argue that whether or 
not any mileage is gained by  such a move depends critically on one's willingness to 
accept certain types of  counterfactuals.. 
For expositional simplicity only, we  will illustrate the problem by means of  a simple 
example with two alternatives (X = {x,  y)) and with only preference-uncertainty. In 
a direct Savage-style approach, the state-space is then given by  the set of  conceivable 
future preference-orderings, i.e.36 by the two linear orders PI,  P2 with xPl y and y P2x, 
as illustrated in the following table. 
A natural subclass of  Savage acts are those induced by  the agent's future choice 
from some opportunity sets A. Such acts have the form fA  : Pi -  arg maxp, A, as- 
signing to each state as "prize" the finally chosen alternative; they will be referred to 
as "generated by the opportunity set A", and their class denoted by FW.  Note that 
on 3m  the sure-thing principle is satisfied vacuously (this holds true in general, irre- 
36disregarding  the pwibility of  future indifference for simplicity. spective of the cardinality of  X). 'Note aJso that due to the inherent state-dependence 
of  conditional preferences, Savage's other key axioms P3 and P4 do not apply here in 
any case. 
Thus, if  one considers preferences over 3q,  the direct Savage approach entails 
no additional restrictions.  It follows that in order to give  the surething principle, 
and thus the direct  Savage approach, any  bite,  arbitrary acts (like (y'x)) need to 
be supported by  appropriate (counterfactual) gedanken-experiments; the question is 
whether acceptable ones exist. 
The most straightforward justification for the admissibility of  arbitrary acts derives 
from postulating a perfectly mind-readzng referee who awards the prize based on the 
agent's future preference ordering. The mind-reading might be that of  an empathetic 
but  potentially  spiteful wife, or  that of  a brzirl-scientist in possession of  a perfect 
"preference detector". 
Gedanken-experiments of  this kind seem not only rather contrived, but also very 
much to go  against  the grain of  the "revealed-preference" approach central  to the 
decision-theoretic tradition, within which preferences are identified with dispositions 
to choice-behavior.  Thus perhaps somewhat more plausible is a story in which the 
referee obtains knowledge of  the agent's preference through the agent's own truthful 
revelation.  This, however, leads to a severe incentivecompatibility  problem, since 
honest reporting will often be contrary to the agent's current interest, i.e. to acting 
in accordance with the choice-function  defining the state.  In  the above example, 
for instance, an agent faced with the "prima-facie act"  (y,  x) in terms of  reported preferences will report P2 if  his true preferences are PI,  and vice versa, thus inducing 
the act (2,  y) in terms of  his true preferences. Note that at no point in the argument 
have we denied that the agent himself has introspective access to his own preferences; 
that simply is not enough to support arbitrary acts.  The issue is rather whether it 
may  be feasible for the agent to commit himself  at present to make choices in the 
future contrary to his preferences at that time. 
If  this is doubted, the discussion suggests that only incentive-compatible acts cor- 
respond to plausible  thought-experiments; an act is incentive-compatible if, for any 
pair of  weak orders R and R' on X, f (12) R  f (R')~~;  in other words, if, for all weak 
orders R, 
f (R) E arg maR{  f  (R1)I  R' is weak order on X). 
Thus, incentive-compatible acts are precisely those induced by  some opportunity 
set; as a result the sure-thing princ:iple is vacuously satisfied on the class of  incentive- 
compatible acts, and the state-structure turns out to be redundant.  In other words, 
a preference relation over opportunity acts38 is effectively as primitive as can be. 
It should  be  noted  that analogous revealed-preference / incentive-compatibility 
considerations do not undermine t,he decision-theoretic approach to game-theory in 
which players are assumed to have beliefs about others' beliefs (respectively prefer- 
ences on a state-space that includes others' preferences). In a nutshell, the difference 
to the intrapersonal intertemporal case is that in a game with self-interested players, 
player i's belief that another player j has placed some bet on i's own betting behavior 
does not interfere with i's actual betting behavior since, by self-interestedness, i does 
not care whether j  wins or loses his bet. By contrast, an agent's "future self" i will 
typically care about whether the "initial self"  j wins his bet or not: not only do the 
37~n  a general deterministic model, an act f  maps weak orders to alternatives. 
=that  is, in the absence of  non-preference uncertainty assumed here, a preference relation over 
opportunity sets. interests of  the initial and future selves typically coincide, but also the initial self's 
bets can only be physically paid out to the future self! 
We have argued that incentive-compatibility constraints may be of concern even on 
a normative interpretation on which acts correspond to a decision-maker's though& 
experiments. On the other hand, on a behavioral interpretation concerned with ~al 
experiments, these constraints seem to be binding in principle. Fortunately, theorem 
3 has shown that the hypothesis of  EIU maximization with respect to ali uncertainty 
remains testable in principle nonetheless. 
APPENDIX: PROOFS 
Proof of Fact 1. 
i) =+  iii)  . True since p PR, q iinplies 1  psu(S) > 1  qsu(S) , with R,  defined 
SEA  SEA 
by  X&'Y  44 2  4~). 
iii) + ii).  True since p({S  1  5: n  A  # 0)  coincides with expected utility from p 
under the indirect-utility function v~  given by  C pSvA(S)  . 
SEA 
ii) +  i). True since p ER q  is  equivalent  by  definition to P({S  I S n A # 0)  1 
q({S I S fl  A # 0)  for all A of  the form {x 1  xRy}, for some y E  X. . 
Proof of Theorem 1: 
It is well-known that vNM imp1j.e~  the existence of  a vNM utility-function u  : A +R 
such that 
In view of  fact 3 below, we  need to show that ;1 satisfies ISD if  and only if  XA = 
\Ir- '  (u)(A)  2  0 for all A E A*. Note first  that p({S  I  S n  A #  0))  = \E(p)(A). The dual  Mobius operator  \E 
thus maps opportunity prospects p  to their characteristic profiles \E(p),  establishing 
a  linear  isomorphism  between  A-A and the space of  characteristic  profiles rA  := 
*(A*)  = {p E R*  I p  is monotone, uniformly submodular and p(X) = 1).  The 
desired  result  is obtained  by  studying  the induced preferences over characteristic 
profiles. 
? defined on aA  induces  on 1rA according to 
s  is said to be monotone if  p > p'  +  p s  p'. Fact 1 impliesp 1> q  9Cp) 2  Q(q). 
This yields part i) of  the following fact. In view of  facts 2, iii) and equation (6),  one 
also easily verifies its second part. 
Fact 4  i)  is monotone if and only if 17  satisfies ISD. 
ii) p  p1  if  and only if  C  XAp(A) 2 C  XApl(A) , for all p,pl  E  rA. 
AEA*  AEA* 
In view of  fact 4, i) ?  the theorern follows from the following lemma. 
Lemma 1  is monotone if  and only if  XA > 0  for all A E A*. 
Proof of lemma. 
EA SnAfQ  Only if:  define 77, by  ji(A) = @&.  = 1 - 
2n-#A-1 
2n-1  ,  for all A E A. 
77, is in the interior of  rA,  since  I$  is a homeomorphism and V1(77,)=&  . 1 is in 
the interior of  A~.  Thus, for any A E A' and small enough E, 77, + &liA)  E rA.  By 
the monotonicity of  and fact 4, ii) ,  2  0. 
The converse is immediate, noting that Q(p)(X)  = 1 for all p E  aA.~ 
Remark:  Characteristic profiles are, from the mathematical point of  view, "plau- 
sibility functions" in the sense of  the theory of  belief-functions (Shafer (1976)); how- 
ever, in contrast to the intended interpretation of  that theory, a characteristic profile does not express a non-additive belief about the state-space A*, but rather proba- 
bilistic beliefs about events in A*  of  the form {S I S  n  T # 0). 
Proof of Theorem 3: 
Let {pi}iEI and {u,}~~~  as in theorem 2, which implies in particular 
f  ti  g if and only if /  ui(f (0))dpi 2  1  u, (g(B))dp,, for all f,  g E 3.  (7) 
For given  i E I, define  >-f  on aA  according to p, o f-'  >-f  pi o g-l  if  and only 
if f  >-i  g , for all f,  g E 3. By  the representation  (7), >-t  is well-defined.  From the 
convex-rangedness of  pi  and the definition of 3, {pi o f -l  1  f  € 3) = nA;  kf  is 
therefore complete.  From (7),  it follows that tf  satisfies all of  the vNM axioms and 
is represented by  the vNM utility-function ui. [ These facts have been in fact derived 
by  Savage as a key step in obtaining his representation theorem in the first place 1. 
ISD* of  is clearly equivalent to IS11 of  >.f.  By  theorem 1, this in turn is equiv- 
alent  to a  representation of  ui  according to ui(A) =  C  Xii maxZcA  vLt(x) , for 
4  E Q, 
appropriate R,,  Xi  E  A
ni , and {v~~)~,~~,  . 
Proof of Fact 2. 
1. i) ===+  . If  u is a DIU-function, then u = v(Z,xu(s)=l) . 
2.  i) t=  . By  definition of  a simple function, vs(A) = 1 if  and only if  32 E X : 
x E A n  S ,  which in turn holds if  and only if  32 E A : vs({x)) = 1. 
3. ii) +== . Consider u = C  Xsvs,  fbr  X  E R~ such that As  > 0 for S # X, and 
SEA 
such that As  > 0 and AT > 0 imply S G  T or S > T . Define A = {S E d 1  As  > 0 
or S = X}. Then u({x)) =  1 X5:  , for  all x  E X, and u(A) =  C  AS 
SEA:S~X  St  A:SnAf 0 
=u({y)) for any  y  E n{S  E A  I S n  A # 8);  such y exist by  the assumed ordering 
property of  A. Since clearly u(A) 2  u(i[z)) for all z E A, u(A) = mXz€A  ~({x));  u 
is thus an IU-function. 4.  ii) *  . If  u is an IU-function, let {x~)~=~,..,,  be an enumeration of  X such that 
u({xk)) 2 U({X~+~))  for k = 1, .., n. Then 
denotes a function of  the desired  form.  By  part  3., w  is an lU-function.  To 
show its equality to u,  it thus suffices to show equality for singleton-sets, as follows: 
Proof of Fact  3. 
Extend u to R~~  by setting ,u(e)) = 0, and set X0 = 0 as well. Define 0 : RA  x (0) 4 
By construction, 1(A) =  1:  As -  C  As  =  1 As. 
S~2~:SnXf0  S~2X:Sn4~#0  Sc2X:S&A 
Let  @ : R~ x (0) -+  RA  x (0) denote the linear ("Mijbius") operator that maps X 
to  1 as just described. Shafer (1976) has shown the following. 
Proposition 2  (Shafer) iP : RA  x  (0)  -+ RA  x (0)  is a bijective  linear map.  Its 
inverse @-'  is given by 
()(A)  =  1 (-l)#(A'\S)l(~:~  for A E  2.Y 
SE~~:S~A 
Since Q is invertible (with inverse Q-'  = 0;  this follows from noting that 1(1(A))  = 
u(A) ), one can write \k = 0-' (1  iP , and thus also V1  = W1  o Q. Specifically, in 
view of  proposition 2, one obtains W1(u)(A)  =  C  (-I)#(~\~)(U(X)  -  u(Sc))  , 
SE~X:S&A 
for A E A. Since  1  (-I)#(~\') == 0 (cf. Shafer (1976, p.47)) , one can simplify 
SE~":SCA Proof of Theorem 4. 
In view of  corollary 1 and the decornposition V1  = W1  o Q as in  the proof of 
fact 3, the theorem is an immediate consequence of  the following two lemmas.  Let 
A**  = 2X\{~). 
Lemma 2  i) u is  monotone (on. A)  if  and  only if the associated  loss-function 1 = 
0(u)  is  monotone on  A+*. 
ii) u  is unifody submodular (on A) if  and  only if  the  associated  loss-function 
1 = @(u)  is uniformly supermoddar on A'*,  i.e. if, for any finite collection {Ak)kEK 
Proof of lemma. Part i) is obvious from the definition of  1. 
For part ii), we shall prove the ',only-if" part; the "if" part follows from reading the 
proof given backwards. Thus, consider a finite collection {Ak)kEK  in A** such that 
/  \  /  \ 
U  Ak C X; it needs to be shown that 1  C  (-1)#~+l1 
kt  K  J:0#Jc  K 
This follows from the equivalence of  the three inequalities just below, as well as the 
equivalence of " U Ak c X  "and " n A; # 0" 
k€K  k€K 
is by the definition of  1 and computation of  complements equivalent to 
,.(Xi -  ("  k€K  A:)  2 z  (-11*~+l 
J:a#J(Z  K 
which, due to the equality  1:  (--l)#Jt  = 1, is equivalent to 
J:@#JC_  K Lemma 3  1 is monotone and uniformly .supennodular on  A** if and only if W1  (z)(A)  2 
0  for all A E A**. 
Proof of lemma.  For s E X, let A, = 2.Y\{x}.  It follows from Shafer's (1976) 
theorem 2.1 (see also Chateauneuf-Jaffray  (1989), Corollary 1) for any x E X that 1 
is uniformly supermodular on R,  if  and only if  W1  (l)(A)  >.  0 for all A E A,.  The 
claim follows from noting that UZcIx  R,  = A**.  H 
Proof of Corollarv 2. 
By standard arguments , the vNM axioms ensure the existence of  a vNM repre- 
sentation  p  >.  q  C psu(S) 2 C qsu(S). Monotonicity and opportunity risk- 
SEA  SE  A 
aversion of ? are then easily verified to be equivalent to monotonicity and uniform 
submodularity of  the utility-function u.  H 
Proof of Theorem 6. 
Necessity is straightforward. 
For sufficiency, assume w.1.o.g.  that u(X)  = 0 , and hence that u(S)  5 0 for all 
S E  A.  Let  urn : A 4 R defined  by  u,,(S)  = -(-~(5'))~.  Let  Am  denote the 
associated coefficient vector Am = \3rP1 (urn);  note that -um(A) =  C  AT. 
SCAC 
We want  to show that, for some sufficiently large m, urn is an EIU-function.  By 
fact 2,iii) , it thus needs to be shown that for some sufficiently large m : AT > 0 for 
all S # X. Since X is finite, it sdEces to show that for all S E A*,  AT  2  0 for all 
sufficiently large m. Take S E A*. 
Case 1: For some x E S : u(S
C U {x}) = u(S
C).  Then um(Sc  U {x})  = u
m(SC); 
since, moreover, urn  satisfies OSM  because u does, it follows that A?  = 0 by lemma 
4 below. Case 2: For all x E S : u(S
C U {x})  :>  u(S
C).  Then A'$  > 0 for sufliciently large m 
by lemma 5 below. 
Lemma 4  For any w  satisfying OSM, A E  A, and x E X: 
w(A  U (2))  = w(A)  implies AT = 0 for all T  such that x E  T C A
C. 
Proof of lemma.  Fix x E X.  The claim is shown by downward induction on 
the size of  A. It holds vacuously for A := X. 
Thus, assume the claim to be true for all B such that B > A, and assume also 
w(A  U {[x))  = w(A).  (8) 
By OSM, w(B  U {x))  = w(B)  for all  B > A; 
hence by induction assumption, A?  ==  0 for all T such that x E T c A
C : AT = 0. 
Since equation 8 implies by the definition of  A:  C  AT  = w(AU {x))  -  w(A)  = 
T:z€T&AC 
0 , it follows that AAc = 0.  0 
XmI  Lemma 5  i)  limsup -U,;S(~.) < 00. 
m+co 
AT  ii)  In case 2:  lim  = 1. 
m--tm -um(SC) 
Proof of  lemma.  From A?  = .-um(SC)  - C  A?  , one obtains 
TC  S 
Let qs =lim sup  *"  . Due to the monotonicity of  u,  I  )  1- < 1 in equation 
m+m  um(SC) 
(9). One thus obtains from equation (9),  qs < 1 + C  for S E A. 
TC  S 
Part i) follows from this by induction on the size of  S. 
Part ii) follows from the validity of  i) for T C S,  and the fact that satisfaction of 
the condition "for all x E S : u(SC  u  {x)) > u(Sc)"  implies  +  0 as  m +  oo, 
u,(SC) 
for all T such that T C S. . Proof of Proposition 1. 
i) follows from theorem 1 and fact 2,iii) . 
ii) By the unique determinacy of  vNM-utility functions up to positive affine trans- 
formations, u = 1  XTvT and u'  = C  X;vT  must be positive afhe  transformations 
TEA  TEA 
of  each other. The claim is thus a straiglntforward implication of  the behavior of V1 
under afhe transformations described by  the following fact which itself follows at 
once from the linearity \E-'  and the definition of  Q; note that changes in the "level" 
of  u affect only the coefficient on vx representing global indifference. 
Fact 5  For any u  E  R~,  c > 0 and d E  R  : 
cV1(u)  (T)  ifT#X 
(Cutdl)  (T)  = 
cW1(u)(T)  + d  if  T = X. 
iii) is straightforward from ii).  H REFERENCES 
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